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Abstract
This paper contributes to further closing the gap between formal analysis and concrete implementations
of security protocols by introducing a quantitative extension of the usual Dolev-Yao intruder model. This
extended model provides a basis for considering protocol attacks that are possible when the intruder has
a reasonable amount of computational power, in particular when he is able, with a certain probability, to
guess encryption keys or other particular kind of data such as the body of a hashed message. We also show
that these extensions do not augment the computational complexity of the protocol insecurity problem in
the case of a ﬁnite number of interleaved protocol sessions.
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1 Introduction
In the last years, a number of tools have been proposed for the formal analysis of
security protocols, e.g. [1,8,10,15,22,25,27,29,32]). These tools have helped prove
several protocols correct and have uncovered ﬂaws in several other protocols. How-
ever, there are many protocols that have not yet been analyzed and which, in fact,
are out of the scope of these tools. One of the main reasons for this is that the
tools analyze protocols under the assumptions of perfect cryptography and that the
protocol messages are exchanged over a network that is under the control of a
Dolev-Yao (DY) intruder [16]. That is, protocols are analyzed by considering the
standard protocol-independent, asynchronous model of an active intruder who con-
trols the network but cannot break cryptography (in particular, the intruder can
intercept messages and analyze them, but only if he possesses the corresponding
keys for decryption, and he can generate messages from his knowledge and send
them under any agent name). Hence, the DY model is too weak to specify sev-
eral types of security protocols, namely those including coin tossing and intrinsic
cryptographic primitives (such as zero-knowledge proof systems, oblivious transfer,
secure computation, and bit commitment).
Moreover, it is well known that there are protocols that can be proved secure
for the DY model, but are insecure when considering speciﬁc cryptosystems. For
example, a “correct” implementation of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol can
be attacked if El-Gamal is used as the underlying cryptosystem [33]. However,
problems with the real implementation of the protocols are not addressed by the
current generation of security protocol analysis tools, and even when results that
relate symbolic and complexity models [2,3,4,5,6,9,11,12,14,19,20,23,24,30,31,35,36]
are exploited, the equivalence is up to a negligible function and so attacks might be
found when we are in the “real world”.
The main goal of our work is to further close the gap between formal analysis
and concrete implementations of security protocols by introducing a quantitative
extension of the classical Dolev-Yao model, which we call pDY. This allows us
to consider protocol attacks that are possible when the intruder has a reasonable
amount of computational power, in particular when he is able to guess encryption
keys or other speciﬁc kind of data.
We formalize such an intruder model by extending the DY model with addi-
tional structure and intruder capabilities. As an example, while in the DY model
encryption is considered a “black box” operation that can only be undone with
the right decryption key, in the pDY model we introduce new intruder deduction
rules, parameterized by the encryption scheme that is being used, which allow the
intruder to obtain the decryption key from the encrypted message. Similarly, as
another relevant example, we also introduce a deduction rule where we allow the
intruder to deduce the body of a hashed message. As one may expect, these op-
erations (should) only occur in the “real world” with small probability, hence the
derivations obtained using these rules should also reﬂect attacks that are almost
infeasible.
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When using the DY model, it is customary to formalize interleaved executions
of a protocol as an inﬁnite-state transition system, which can then be searched for
states that represent protocol attacks (e.g. a state where the intruder gets hold
of some data that was intended to be a secret between two honest agents). This
transition system deﬁnes a computation tree in the standard way, where the root is
the initial system state and children represent the ways that a state can evolve in
one transition. In the pDY model, we extend this search tree so that each possible
transition is weighed with a probability; for instance, a state where it is possible
to guess a key will have a successor that includes the knowledge of that key, but
this transition will be weighed with the probability of guessing the key. Since each
transition of the tree will be weighed with the probability of that transition, we can
compute the probabilities associated with the branches of the tree, and in the end
we will be able to tell with which probability each attack is possible.
Another contribution of our work is to show that the computational complexity
of protocol insecurity in the case of a ﬁnite number of interleaved protocol sessions
is not augmented by our extensions. As shown, for instance, in [26], searching
for an attack in the classical DY intruder model is an NP-complete problem when
considering ﬁnite numbers of protocol sessions, and we prove that if we consider the
extended probabilistic intruder model pDY, the problem remains NP-complete.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the intruder deduction prob-
lem for the classical DY intruder model and provide a complexity analysis of the
decision version of a model-checking algorithm for ﬁnite numbers of protocol ses-
sions. In Section 3, we introduce a quantitative extension of the classical DY model
and provide a complexity analysis of the corresponding extension of the model-
checking algorithm. In Section 4, we consider a simple example to illustrate how
our probabilistic intruder pDY can be applied for protocol analysis. In Section 5
we compare with related work and give an outlook on future research directions.
2 Model checking protocols under the Dolev-Yao in-
truder
Roughly speaking, a Dolev-Yao intruder [16] is an agent that completely controls
the network but cannot break cryptography. By controlling the network we mean
that the intruder can impersonate other agents, prevent messages from reaching
their destination, or reroute them to other agents. The intruder can also generate
messages from the knowledge he has acquired and send them to any agent, but he
cannot break encryption unless he knows the corresponding key and cannot compute
the content of a hashed message unless he knows it already. For this reason, the
knowledge of the intruder plays a fundamental role in the DY model.
In fact, one of the core problems of security protocol analysis is the so-called
intruder deduction problem: given a state of the protocol execution, can the intruder
derive a given message M? Derivation here is relative to the terms the intruder
currently knows, i.e. relative to the closure under a set of deduction rules of his
initial knowledge augmented with the messages that he has observed during protocol
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execution.
The intruder deduction problem provides the basis for solving a number of practi-
cally relevant protocol analysis problems. One can, for instance, use it to determine
whether the intruder is able to construct a message of the form that some honest
agent is expecting to receive, or whether he is able to obtain a message that is
intended to be a secret, e.g. a key shared by two honest agents.
Since the DY intruder model abstracts away cryptography, complexity and prob-
ability, it reduces attacks to unexpected protocol interleavings that “leak” informa-
tion to the intruder. Hence, security is reduced to checking a safety condition;
roughly speaking, is it true that the intruder never obtains/produces some private
data? Model checking is particularly appealing to deal with such problems. The
basic idea for model checking a safety condition is to check whether it is possible to
reach a state where the condition fails. The model-checking algorithm consists in
generating all possible reachable states and checking for each of these states whether
the condition holds or not.
In general, in the case of an arbitrary number of protocol sessions that can be
executed in an interleaved way, the problem is undecidable since it can be reduced
to the halting problem. Under the restriction to a ﬁnite number of sessions, the
problem of searching for an attack in the DY intruder model is an NP-complete
problem [26] (and therefore checking if a protocol is secure is co-NP complete).
The approach that we consider in this paper is general and technology-
independent, and can thus be eﬀectively incorporated in diﬀerent techniques and
tools for security protocol analysis. For concreteness, we consider the constraint-
based on-the-ﬂy-model-checker OFMC [1,7,32]. 8 We will now summarize the key
deﬁnitions and results that underlie OFMC (as well as a number of other approaches
and tools), which in Section 3 we will then extend to model the probabilistic intruder
that we consider here. More concretely, we now give a model-checking algorithm
inspired to the approach of OFMC for ﬁnite numbers of sessions and provide a de-
tailed complexity analysis of this algorithm. To that end, we begin by considering
the context-free grammar given in [7] for formalizing protocol descriptions:
Deﬁnition 2.1 Let C and V be disjoint countable sets of constants (denoted by
lowercase letters) and variables (denoted by uppercase letters). The syntax of our
8 OFMC has been developed in the context of the AVISPA project. The AVISPA Tool is a fully automated
protocol analysis environment that comprises of OFMC and three other tools (called CL-AtSe, SATMC,
and TA4SP) and that has been successfully applied for the push-button analysis of a large number of
industrial-scale security protocols.
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protocol speciﬁcation language is deﬁned by the following context-free grammar:
ProtocolDescr ::= (State ,Rule∗,AttackRule∗)
Rule ::= LHS⇒RHS
AttackRule ::= LHS
LHS ::= State NegFact Condition
RHS ::= State
State ::= PosFact ( . PosFact)∗
NegFact ::= ( . not(PosFact) )∗
PosFact ::= state(Msg) | msg(Msg) | i knows(Msg) | secret(Msg ,Msg)
Condition ::= ( ∧ Msg = Msg )∗
Msg ::= AtomicMsg | ComposedMsg
ComposedMsg ::= 〈Msg ,Msg〉 | {Msg}Msg | {|Msg |}Msg | Msg(Msg) | Msg
−1
AtomicMsg ::= C | V | N | fresh(C,N)
We write L(n) for the context-free language associated with the nonterminal n. We
write vars(t) to denote the set of variables occurring in a (message, fact, or state)
term t, and when vars(t) = ∅, we say that t is ground, and write ground(t). We
straightforwardly extend the functions vars and ground to the more complex terms.
In this paper, we give a quick intuitive top-down explanation of the used gram-
mar. We refer the reader to [7] for a detailed explanation.
A protocol is represented by a term in L(ProtocolDescr ), that is, a triple
(I,R,AR), where I is the initial state, R is the set of transition rules, and AR
is the set of rules for identifying an attack state.
A state denotes the internal status of the network and is represented by a set of
positive facts. There are four types of positive facts: (i) state(Msg), which represents
the local state of an honest agent; (ii) msg(Msg), which represents a message in
transit through the network (i.e. one sent but not yet received); (iii) i knows(Msg),
which represents a message known by the intruder; and (iv) secret(Msg ,Msg), which
represents a secret message, where secret(m,a) means that m is a secret and that
agent a is allowed to know it.
Rules describe state transitions. The left-hand side lhs of a rule r = lhs ⇒ rhs
consists of a set of positive facts P , a set of negative facts N , and a condition Cond ,
where vars(P ) ⊇ vars(N) ∪ vars(Cond). Negative facts are negations of positive
facts, and usually only negations of state and secret facts are considered. Conditions
are just conjunctions of inequalities of messages. Intuitively, the rules model the
communication steps of honest agents executing a protocol. More speciﬁcally, rules
model the transitions of the honest agents executing a protocol, i.e. transitions in
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which honest agents send a message in reply to another message they have received.
The states where such a transition are enabled are described by the lhs of the
associated rule. The state after the execution of the step is described by the rhs
of the rule, which consists only of positive facts. Attack rules model the conditions
for which an attack on the protocol is possible, and consist only of a lhs that
characterizes the states for which the attack condition holds.
Message terms are used to describe all relevant information, like the intruder
knowledge, keys, states of the network, etc. Messages can be either atomic or
composed. An atomic message is a constant, a variable, a natural number, or a
fresh constant. The fresh constants are used to model the creation of random data,
e.g. nonces, during a protocol session. Following [7], we model each fresh data item
by a unique term fresh(c,n), where c is an identiﬁer and the number n denotes
the particular protocol session that c is intended for. Messages can be composed
using pairing 〈m1,m2〉, or the cryptographic operators {m2}m1 and {|m2|}m1 (for
asymmetric and symmetric encryption of m2 with m1), m1(m2) (for application of
the function m1 to the message m2, representing a hash-function or key-table), or
m−1 (for the asymmetric inverse of m).
Before we present the model-checking algorithm for protocols described in the
language above, we consider a simpliﬁcation presented in [7]. First, we assume that
AR is constituted just by one attack rule. Moreover, we only consider protocols
(I,R,AR) where the rules r = lhs ⇒ rhs ∈ R are of the form
msg(m1).state(m2).P1.N1 ∧Cond ⇒ state(m3).msg(m4).P2 , (1)
where N1 is a set of negative facts that do not contain i knows or msg facts, P1
and P2 are sets of positive facts that do not contain state or msg facts. Moreover,
we require that if i knows(m) ∈ P1 then i knows(m) ∈ P2; this ensures that the
intruder knowledge is monotonic, i.e. that the intruder never forgets messages during
transitions.
The state facts appearing in both the lhs and the rhs of the rule mean that the
rule describes a transition of an honest agent. Also, in both sides we have a msg
fact representing the incoming message that the agent expects to receive in order
to make the transition (in the lhs) and the agent’s answer message (in the rhs).
The rule corresponding to the initial (respectively, ﬁnal) protocol step contains no
incoming (respectively, outgoing) message. However, the rule form (1) is not a
restriction, as one may always insert a dummy message that can be generated by
the intruder. In fact, as argued in [7], rules of the form (1) are adequate to describe
a very large class of industrial-scale security protocols, including protocols in the
Clark/Jacob protocol library [13] as well as Internet protocols such as Kerberos,
SET, IPSec, IKE, TLS, and H.530.
The basic idea underlying model checking for a protocol description (I,R, AR)
is to build a state transition system modeling interleaved executions of the protocol
by starting from the initial state I, which contains the initial knowledge of the
honest protocol agents and of the intruder, and compute each successor state by
applying the transition rules in R. For each of these successor states, we check




m1 ∈ DY(M) m2 ∈ DY(M)
〈m1,m2〉 ∈ DY(M)
Gpair
m1 ∈ DY(M) m2 ∈ DY(M)
{m2}m1 ∈ DY(M)
Gcrypt
m1 ∈ DY(M) m2 ∈ DY(M)
{|m2|}m1 ∈ DY(M)
Gscrypt













∈ DY(M) m1 ∈ DY(M)
m2 ∈ DY(M)
A−1crypt
{|m2|}m1 ∈ DY(M) m1 ∈ DY(M)
m2 ∈ DY(M)
Ascrypt
Fig. 1. The generation and analysis rules of the classical DY intruder.
whether an attack-rule in AR can be applied. If this is the case, then we have found
an attack, otherwise we compute the next successor states and iterate the process
until an attack is found or no more states can be generated. The latter situation
only occurs in the case of a ﬁnite number of sessions.
In Deﬁnition 2.3 below, we give (the decision version of) a model-checking algo-
rithm for ﬁnite numbers of protocol sessions under the classical Dolev-Yao intruder.
This algorithm is (implicitly) given in [7] but its complexity is not investigated
there. To provide a complexity analysis of the algorithm, we need to formalize the
ways for generating successor states and for ﬁnding attacks. We start by describing
how to generate successor states. Since rules model protocol steps, the successor
states of a state S are obtained by analyzing the rules that are applicable to this S,
that is, the rules for which S “satisﬁes” the pre-condition associated to the lhs.
Let substitutions σ be mappings from V to L(Msg). As we will formally deﬁne
below, a rule is applicable to a state if (i) the positive facts are contained in the
state for some substitution σ of the rule’s variables, (ii) the negative facts under
σ are not contained, and (iii) the condition Cond is satisﬁed under σ. Recall that
the right-hand side rhs of a rule lhs ⇒ rhs is just a set of positive facts, where
vars(lhs) ⊇ vars(rhs). The successors of a state S are then the states generated by
replacing in S the facts that match the positive facts of the lhs of some applicable
rule with the rhs of that rule.
Observe that the intruder has the power to replace the messages involved in the
applicable rule with any messages he knows or can generate from his knowledge.
For this reason, it is essential to describe the set of messages known by the intruder.
Deﬁnition 2.2 For a set M of messages, we deﬁne the Dolev-Yao intruder knowl-
edge DY(M) as the smallest set closed under the generation (G ) and analysis (A )
rules given in Fig. 1.
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The generation rules express that the intruder can compose messages from
known messages using pairing, asymmetric and symmetric encryption, and func-
tion application. The analysis rules describe how the intruder can decompose mes-
sages. Note that no rules are given that allow the intruder to analyze function
applications, for example to recover m from h(m), where h is some hash function.
Moreover, note that this formalization correctly handles non-atomic keys, for in-
stance m ∈ DY({{|m|}h(k1 ,k2), k1, k2, h}).
We are now able to give an analytical presentation of the set of successor states,
but before let us ﬁx some notation. Let P1 be obtained from P1 by removing all
i knows facts
P1 = P1 \ {f | ∃m. f = i knows(m)} .
We deﬁne the applicability of a rule r of the form (1) by the function Applicable
that maps a state S and the left-hand side lhs of r to the ground substitution σ,
under which the rule can be applied to the state:
Applicablelhs(S) = {σ |
ground(σ) ∧ dom(σ) = vars(m1) ∪ vars(m2) ∪ vars(P1)
∧ {m1σ} ∪ {mσ|i knows(m) ∈ P1} ⊆ DY({m|i knows(m) ∈ S})
∧ state(m2σ) ∈ S ∧ P1σ ⊆ S
∧ (∀f. not(f) ∈ N1 =⇒ fσ ∈ S) ∧ σ  Cond}.





that, given a set R of rules of the form (1) and a state S, yields the corresponding




∧ S′ = (S\(state(m2σ) ∪ P1σ)) ∪ state(m3σ) ∪ i knows(m4σ) ∪ P2σ}.
As described before, the transition system that models a protocol (I,R, AR) is
built by applying the successor function to the initial state I of the protocol and
then to its successors. In this way, we obtain the set of reachable states, and it
is important to note that this set is a ground model. No reachable state contains
variables because of the way we deﬁne the transitions.





Finally, we describe how to characterize insecure states. For this purpose, we
introduce an attack predicate isAttackAR(S) that is true when an attack determined
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by the attack-rule AR is found at state S. This attack predicate isAttackAR(S) is
true iﬀ the rule AR can be applied to the state S, i.e. ApplicableAR(S) = ∅.
For simplicity, we consider here only a decision version of the model-checking
algorithm. This means the algorithm just determines whether there exists an attack
or not; while the attack itself is not returned. We initialize S as the knowledge
available initially to the intruder and the honest protocol agents, that is, given a
protocol P = (I,R,AR) state S equals I.
Deﬁnition 2.3 Decision version of the model-checking algorithm for a ﬁnite num-
ber of protocol sessions:
ModelCheck(P)
Input: Protocol P = (S,R,AR)
Output: 1 if the protocol is secure, 0 otherwise
1. If (isAttackAR(S)) then Return 0;
2. Compute the set Applicablelhs(S) for each r ∈ R with r = lhs ⇒ rhs;
3. Compute SuccR(S);
4. For each S′ ∈ SuccR(S);
5. B=ModelCheck(S′, R,AR);
6. If(B==0) then Return 0;
7. Return 1.
Before proceeding with the complexity analysis, we introduce some notation
and make some observations. First, we deﬁne inductively the depth of a message
m ∈ L(Msg) as follows:
• depth(m)=1 if m is atomic;
• depth(c(m))=1+depth(m) if c is a unary constructor;
• depth(c(m1,m2))=1+depth(m1)+depth(m2) if c is a binary constructor.
Note that in Step 2 of the algorithm above, a set of substitution needs to be
computed accordingly with Applicablelhs(S). These substitutions allow the intruder
to replace a message with one he knows. Moreover, by looking at Deﬁnition 2.2, it is
easy to realize that the set of messages that the intruder knows is inﬁnite thanks to
the generation rules. However, by ﬁxing the number of sessions to s and assuming
that each session consists of at most j steps, it is easy to see that only a ﬁnite
number of messages can lead to an attack.
The intuitive argument behind this fact is that the interaction with the agents
can only increase/decrease the depth of the messages involved in the computation
by a ﬁnite amount. Since the overall number of steps for the session is ﬁnite, there
is a limit k such that if there is an attack then there is an attack with messages
exchanged with depth at most k. This value depends on all the parameters of
the protocol: initial state, rules and attacks rules; as well as on the number s of
sessions of the protocol executed in parallel. Moreover, without loss of generality,
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we assume that k is greater than the depth of all message terms occurring in the
protocol. Still in the context of messages terms, the following result gives an upper-
bound to the number of terms up to some depth that are freely generated from an
algebra signature.
Lemma 2.4 The number of terms with depth less than or equal to k for a free
algebra with b binary constructors, u unary constructors, and a atomic symbols is
O((a + b + u)2
k
).
We now address the question of the number of parallel sessions of a protocol.
Assume that there are s sessions of a protocol with j steps running in parallel. Since
we model each step of (a session of) the protocol with a rule r ∈ R, we have j rules
for each session. Moreover, nothing prevents the protocol from being completely
parallel, that is, nothing prevents all the rules in R from being applicable to all
reachable states but the ﬁnal ones. So, we know that for s sessions of the protocol
with j steps we may have at most j × s = n rules that can be applicable at each
state.
We are now able to start the complexity analysis. From Lemma 2.4, we conclude
that the number of message terms with depth less than or equal to k generated
from a atomic symbols is O((a+5)2
k
) (there are 4 binary constructors and 1 unary
constructor for message terms). Since we assume that k upper-bounds the depth
of the message terms of the protocol, the intruder can only learn at most k atomic
symbols per message exchange. If we assume that the intruder initially knows i
atomic messages, we conclude that the total amount of relevant terms the intruder
may learn is O((nk + i + 5)2
k
) = num iknow. By assuming that the lhs and rhs
of the rules in R have at most v variables, the number of substitutions to check if
they are applicable is O(num iknowv) = O((nk + i + 5)v2
k
) = num sub. Since for
each rule we have at most num sub new successor states, and given that there are
at most n rules, the number of successors for a given state is O(n × num sub) =
O(n(nk + i + 5)v2
k
) = num suc.
Observe that the depth of the recursion tree of the model-checking algorithm
is j × s = n, and so the recursion tree will generate at most O(num sucn) =
O(nn(nk + i + 5)nv2
k
) = num tot st total states. In the worst case, the isAttack
predicate has to be checked over all these states, and so the overall time complexity
for Step 1 is obtained by multiplying num tot st with the time complexity of checking
the isAttack predicate.
Recall that the isAttack(S) predicate reduces to checking whether
ApplicableAR(S) = ∅ .
Hence, the time complexity is upper-bounded by the time complexity of computing
ApplicableAR. For any lhs, to compute Applicablelhs we need to range over all
num sub ground substitutions of v variables by num iknow terms known by the
intruder and, moreover, verify for each of these substitutions if certain conditions
hold. The latter veriﬁcation takes polynomial time on the size of the lhs, which
for simplicity we consider to be at most g time for all rules r ∈ R. So, assuming
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that all message terms the intruder knows are stored in memory, with access O(1),
in order to generate all num sub possible substitutions it takes O(num sub × v ×
log(num iknow)) (this corresponds to generating num sub increments on a number
with v digits written in basis num iknow). Thus, the time complexity of computing
Applicablelhs(S) is
O(g × num sub× v × log(num iknow)) = O(gv(nk + i + 5)v2
k
log((nk + i + 5)2
k
))
= O(gv2k(nk + i + 5)v2
k
log(nk + i + 5))
= time app.
Hence, we have that the time complexity of checking the isAttack predicate over all
states is
O(time app × num tot st) = O(gv2knn(nk + i + 5)(n+1)v2
k
log(nk + i + 5)) ,
which takes care of Step 1 of the algorithm.
To compute the complexity of Step 2, we just have to multiply the total number
of states num tot st by the time complexity time app of computing Applicablelhs(S)
and the total number or rules n, obtaining thus
O(gv2knn+1(nk + i + 5)(n+1)v2
k
log(nk + i + 5)) .
The time complexity of Step 3 consists of generating the successor states, which is
bounded by the total number of states. Since we assume that the intruder knowledge
in each state is stored in memory we need to update it. In the worst case, the
number of message terms known by the intruder in each state is O(num iknow).
The time required to update the message terms up to a depth of k is bounded
by O(num iknow2) multiplied by the number of binary rules existing in the DY
model plus O(num iknow) multiplied by the number of unary rules. The idea is
to consider all pairs of known messages and apply all possible binary rules, and
similarly for unitary rules. In detail, for each binary rule, we have to consider each
pair of messages the intruder knows, apply the rule (if possible) and verify if we
obtain an unknown message. If this is the case, we have to add this message to the
knowledge of the intruder and henceforward consider pairs with this new message.
A similar approach to update the knowledge of the intruder is done for unary rules.
Since there are seven binary rules and one proper unary rule (Gaxiom does not need
to be considered) and by assuming that all DY intruder rules take at most d time
to be applied, we conclude that the total time to update the intruder knowledge is
O(d(7num iknow2 + num iknow)) = O(d(nk + i + 5)2
k+1
) = upd know .
Finally, since we need to update the intruder knowledge for every non initial
state, the overall complexity of Step 3 is given by
O(upd know× num tot st) = O(dnn(nk + i + 5)(2+nv)2
k
) .
The remaining steps of the algorithm correspond to traversing the recursion tree,
so we conclude that:
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Proposition 2.5 The overall complexity of the model-checking algorithm Mo-
delCheck(P) for a ﬁnite number of protocol sessions under the classical Dolev-Yao
intruder is
O(gv2knn+1(nk + i + 5)(n+1)v2
k
log(nk + i + 5) + dnn(nk + i + 5)(2+nv)2
k
) .
The above analysis gives an upper-bound on the complexity of the model-
checking algorithm and suggests that the naive model checker is exponential in
the number of protocol steps, protocol sessions and exchanged messages per step,
double exponential in the maximum depth of the messages the intruder needs to
know, and polynomial in the remaining factors. Nevertheless, it hints that the
presented algorithm is rather time expensive. Indeed, this is mostly due to the
excessive number of successor states of the transition system caused by the huge
amount of messages the intruder gets to derive at each protocol step (this leads to
the double exponential factor in the complexity analysis over the maximum depth
of messages the intruder needs to know). A way to avoid this problem is to consider
a symbolic “lazy” intruder (see [7] and the various references there), an intruder
for which the substitutions at Step 2 are postponed and substantially restricted. A
much better performance is achieved for the lazy intruder, however the complexity
analysis is out of the scope of this paper, and is far from being straightforward. The
purpose of the above computation is to set a basis for comparing the complexity of
model-checking under the classical Dolev-Yao intruder with the complexity under
the probabilistic extension of the intruder that we introduce in the next section.
3 Extending the Intruder Model
The classical Dolev-Yao intruder model assumes that cryptography is perfect and
that the intruder can only decrypt an encrypted message if he knows the correspond-
ing decryption key. Since one of the ultimate goals of our work is to augment the
intruder model in such a way to allow the intruder to perform attacks on cryptogra-
phy (e.g. representing that he can break an encryption with a certain probability),
we can no longer ignore the underlying cryptographic schemes used in the protocol
speciﬁcation.
Our approach allows the intruder to “retrieve” certain data from the messages he
knows, but only with some probability of success. The intruder could, for example,
guess keys to decrypt encrypted messages or arguments of hash functions from their
hashed values. This new ability may possibly result in a signiﬁcant increase of the
intruder knowledge and thus open new ways for attacks. It is therefore important
to accurately measure the probability of correctly retrieving data, either by simple
guessing or resorting to cryptanalysis techniques.
In general, with this new intruder model we expect to detect ﬂaws in protocols
caused by badly chosen cryptographic systems in important positions of the protocol
ﬂow, such as a repetitive use of the same encryption key that allows the intruder to
gather enough information to be able to compute the key with a high probability
of success, or use of cryptographic functions with a low security parameter.
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To quantify the eﬀorts of the intruder, we follow an approach based on the
dimensions of the key space of a given cryptographic system and co-domain of
cryptographic functions, taking into account the fact that additional knowledge
may reduce the key space signiﬁcantly. 9 For formalizing protocol descriptions, we
consider the context-free grammar given in Deﬁnition 2.1 and extend it to express
the probability of a transition when guessing is used by the intruder. To keep track
of the transition probabilities, we extend the language with a new positive fact
plabel(R), and we also introduce the function
p : L(Msg)× P(L(PosFact)) → R
such that p(m, IK) returns the probability of the intruder knowing m ∈ L(Msg)
when his knowledge is IK, i.e. a set of positive facts of the form i knows(Msg). We
will explain later how this probability is computed. As a concrete example, we
now consider extending the deductive power of the intruder with three particular
guessing rules.
Deﬁnition 3.1 For a set M of messages, we deﬁne pDY(M) as the smallest set
closed under the rules given in Fig. 2: generation rules (G ), analysis rules (A ), two
rules guessSK and guessPK for the intruder guessing symmetric and inverse (private)
keys, and a rule guessHash that states that whenever the intruder possesses the hash
value of a message he can retrieve that message or part of it (note that we assume
that hash functions are known to all participants and thus to the intruder).
Note that the guessing rules we consider here help us illustrate the principles
of our approach, but, in the presence of other cryptographic operators, we could of
course add other, similar, guessing rules. For instance, we could introduce also a
nested hashing rule
H(. . . H(. . . mi . . . ) . . . ) ∈ pDY(M)
mi ∈ pDY(M)
or even consider a more general rule
mi ∈ pDY(M)
to express that the intruder can guess any message. A critical comparison of all the
diﬀerent possibilities will be subject of future work.
To incorporate the changes in the intruder model, state transitions must reﬂect
the fact that the intruder may have used guessing rules when deriving messages.
Thus, we need to distinguish the deterministic transitions from the probabilistic
ones. To carry out this distinction, we label each transition with the value we obtain
9 Note that other approaches could be used, like the amount of computational power needed for a brute
force attack, or the likelihood of a successful attack given a time bound for cryptanalysis. Of course,
these approaches are highly dependent on the assumptions on the computational power of the intruder,
nonetheless they can be tuned to mirror the capabilities of a relatively powerful intruder. Note also that
the approach we propose here is diﬀerent from, and is in fact complementary to, the symbolic, deductive
approach to oﬀ-line guessing proposed in [18].




m1 ∈ pDY(M) m2 ∈ pDY(M)
〈m1,m2〉 ∈ pDY(M)
Gpair
m1 ∈ pDY(M) m2 ∈ pDY(M)
{m2}m1 ∈ pDY(M)
Gcrypt
m1 ∈ pDY(M) m2 ∈ pDY(M)
{|m2|}m1 ∈ pDY(M)
Gscrypt













∈ pDY(M) m1 ∈ pDY(M)
m2 ∈ pDY(M)
A−1crypt









H(m1, . . . ,mi, . . . ,mk) ∈ pDY(M)
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guessHash
Fig. 2. The deduction rules of the pDY intruder.
from the function p, where p returns 1 if no guessing was needed. When a state
S is found that triggers the attack-rule AR, we determine the attack probability
by traversing backwards the attack trace (from S to I) and multiplying all the
probability labels. Note that by doing so, we only “introduce” new attacks with
respect to the analysis in the classical DY model; the attacks that were already
detectable in the DY model will also be detected in the pDY model and will be
labeled with probability 1.
We deﬁne the extended applicability of a rule r by the extended function
pApplicable that maps a state S and the left-hand side lhs of r to the pair 〈σ, ξ〉,
where σ is a ground substitution and ξ ∈ R, under which the rule can be applied to
the state:
pApplicablelhs(S) = {〈σ, ξ〉 |
ground(σ) ∧ dom(σ) = vars(m1) ∪ vars(m2) ∪ vars(P1)
∧ {m1σ} ∪ {mσ | i knows(m) ∈ P1} ⊆ pDY({m | i knows(m) ∈ S})
∧ ξ = Πt∈co-dom(σ)p(t, {m | i knows(m) ∈ S})
∧ state(m2σ) ∈ S ∧ P1σ ⊆ S
∧ (∀f. not(f) ∈ N1 =⇒ fσ ∈ S) ∧ σ  Cond}.
To compute p(t, {m | i knows(m) ∈ S}), we ﬁrst assume an algorithm prule to
compute the probability prule(ρ) for each instance ρ of a guess rule of the pDY
intruder model. This algorithm depends on the cryptographic assumptions, and it
is assumed to be given for the model-checking algorithm. Given a derivation δ of
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m using the pDY rules, the probability pδ(m) of knowing m through δ is given by
multiplying all the probabilities prule(ρ) associated to the instances of the rules ρ
occurring in δ. We then have that
p(t, IK) = max{pδ(m) | δ is a derivation of m using knowledge IK} .
We will discuss in the extended model-checking algorithm a (naive) way to compute
p(t, IK). For now, let us observe that one could be tempted to deﬁne p(t, IK) as
the sum of the probabilities of all derivations leading to m. However, this may
lead to values greater than 1. The idea behind our approach is that the probability
value associated to the derivation gives a measure of the success of applying the rule
when the computational power of the intruder is consumed. If he tried to apply
some probabilistic rule and failed, then he would have exhausted his computational
power, and cannot apply this or another probabilistic rule again. On the other hand,
if he applies some probabilistic rule successfully, then we assume that the intruder
did not exhaust all his computational power and, therefore, he may continue to
carry out other derivations. Two derivations may lead to the same message m, one
with probability, say, 0.8 and the other with probability, say, 0.9. The probability
of getting this message is then 0.9, since the best bet for the intruder is to try to
obtain m through the second derivation. Another misleading thought may come
from thinking that if a rule has probability of success 0.9, then one should try to
apply it several times until success is achieved. However, the measure associated
to the rules does not mimic a Bernoulli random variable. Trying several times the
same “attack” is already accounted for in the probability assigned to the rule, and if
more attempts are done the computational power of the intruder will be exceeded.





that, given a set R of rules of the form (1) and a state S, yields the corresponding
set of successor states by means of the step function
pSteplhs⇒rhs(S) = {S
′ | ∃σ.∃ξ.
〈σ, ξ〉 ∈ pApplicablelhs(S)
∧ S′ = (S \ (state(m2σ) ∪ P1σ)) ∪ state(m3σ) ∪ i knows(m4σ)
∪ P2σ ∪ plabel(ξ)}.





Given an attack-rule AR and a state S, the attack predicate ispAttackAR(S) is true if
and only if the rule AR can be applied to the state S, that is pApplicableAR(S) = ∅.
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Moreover, given an attack-rule AR, if ispAttackAR(S) is true, then the probability





We are now able to state the probabilistic version of the intruder deduction
problem for a ﬁnite number of sessions in the extended Dolev-Yao model and discuss
the quantitative model-checking algorithm.
Deﬁnition 3.2 Given a protocol (I,R,AR) in the pDY model, the probabilistic
intruder deduction problem consists in determining whether the intruder can learn
a certain message, with probability greater than or equal to p, as deﬁned by AR,
when s sessions of the protocol are run.
It is easy to see that this problem is NP-complete. First notice that the non-
quantitative version of intruder deduction problem can be reduced to this one by
taking p = 1, and so the problem is NP-hard. Moreover, given a trace of the
attack (which includes derivations of the intruder knowledge) we can check, in
polynomial-time, whether this attack is carried out with probability greater than
p. So, there is a polynomial witness veriﬁcation algorithm for the case of a possible
attack. Moreover, if there is no attack, any witness (trace) provided will not result
in verifying an attack. So the problem is in NP, and therefore NP-complete.
Theorem 3.3 The probabilistic intruder deduction problem for a ﬁnite number of
sessions in the pDY intruder model is NP-complete.
Concerning the model-checking algorithm, the extension we propose does not
change much the pseudo-code given in Deﬁnition 2.3.
Deﬁnition 3.4 Decision version of the quantitative model-checking algorithm:
qModelCheck(P,p)
Input: Protocol P = (S,R,AR) and probability p
Output: 1 if the protocol is secure with probability p, 0 otherwise
1. If (ispAttackAR(S) ∧ pAttackAR(S) ≥ p) then Return 0;
2. Compute the set pApplicablelhs(S) for each r ∈ R with r = lhs ⇒ rhs;
3. Compute pSuccR(S);
4. For each S′ ∈ pSuccR(S);
5. B=ModelCheck(S′, R,AR);
6. If(B==0) then Return 0;
7. Return 1.
We proceed by analyzing the complexity of the quantitative model-checking
algorithm. Note that the number of relevant terms needed to be known by both
the classical and the probabilistic intruder is the same, that is, terms with depth at
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most k. Hence, in the worst case, the total number of states of the recursion tree
is the same (asymptotically) for both the classical and quantitative model checker,
that is,
O(nn(nk + i + 5)nv2
k
) = num tot st ,
where n = j × s is the product of the number of steps j of the protocol and the
number of sessions s, i is the number of initial atomic messages known by the
intruder, and v is the maximum number of variables existing in a lhs of the rules in
R and AR.
There are clearly some diﬀerences between the quantitative and the classical
model-checking algorithms. Namely, we have to change the way the function
pApplicablelhs(S) is computed and the way the successor states are generated (in-
cluding how the knowledge of the intruder increases). Moreover, we have to compute
pAttackAR(S).
We start by noticing that in the extended model, pApplicablelhs(S) returns pairs
〈σ, ξ〉 and that ξ is uniquely determined from σ and the intruder knowledge. Like
for the classical DY model and for the sake of simplicity, we assume that we have in
memory all terms known by the intruder with their probabilities, and that we can
access these values in O(1) time. So, the time to compute pApplicablelhs(S) in the
pDY model is the same as in the DY model multiplied by the time to compute ξ.
Since ξ is a product of v elements that can be obtained in O(1), this multiplication
can be achieved in v time (each multiplication takes O(1) since it is a ﬂoating point
multiplication). Hence, pApplicablelhs(S) is computed in
O(v × time app) = O(gv22k(nk + i + 5)v2
k
log(nk + i + 5)) .
Now we show how pAttackAR(S) can be computed in O(1). Indeed, we will not
check for the plabel facts in state S, but rather have a register that stores the
probability of reaching S. This register is initialized to 1, and when a successor of
S is computed via a pair 〈σ, ξ〉, this register is multiplied by ξ (which takes O(1)
time). Thus, this register gives the probability of reaching a state S and when this
state has an attack, the register takes the value pAttackAR(S).
Hence, the time complexity of checking the ispAttack predicate and computing
pAttackAR(S) over all states is
O(v × time app× num tot st) = O(gv22knn(nk + i + 5)(n+1)v2
k
log(nk + i + 5)) ,
which takes care of Step 1.
To compute the complexity of Step 2 we just have to multiply the total
number of states num tot st by the time complexity of computing the function
pApplicablelhs(S) and the total number or rules n, obtaining thus
O(gv22knn+1(nk + i + 5)(n+1)v2
k
log(nk + i + 5)).
In Step 3 we update the intruder knowledge for all the successor states. As stated
above, we assume that the intruder knowledge is stored in memory with access time
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O(1). In the worst case, the intruder knowledge has O(num iknow) messages, thus
the time required for updating is bounded by O(num iknow2) multiplied by the
number of binary rules existing in the pDY model plus O(num iknow) multiplied
by the number of unary rules. We consider the guessing rules to be unary rules and
we ignore the non-belonging proviso. When a guessing rule ρ is applied to m to
derive m′, in order to calculate the probability of getting m′, we take from memory
the probability p of knowing m, and three situations may happen:
• if m′ was not known before, then we introduce this term with probability p ×
prule(ρ);
• if m′ was known before and its probability was smaller than p × prule(ρ), then
we update this probability;
• if m′ was known before and its probability was greater than or equal to p×prule(ρ),
then nothing is done.
Observe that if a probability of a term is updated, we need to iterate the updating
process until no probability is increased. So, if ε is the smallest increase possible in
a probability term (note that ε is the desired precision we want for the probabilities
to be computed), in the worst case each rule only increases the probability of each
term by ε, and so we have to apply each rule 1/ε times. Hence, the total amount
of time to update the intruder knowledge at one state for the pDY model is
O(1/ε × d× num iknow2) = O(1/ε× d(nk + i + 5)2
k+1
) = O(1/ε × upd know) ,
where d is an upper bound for the time it takes to apply a rule. Finally, since
we need to update the intruder knowledge for every non-initial state, the overall
complexity of Step 3 is given by
O(1/ε × upd know× num tot st) = O(1/ε × dnn(nk + i + 5)(2+nv)2
k
) .
The remaining steps of the algorithm correspond to traversing the recursion tree,
so we conclude that:
Proposition 3.5 The overall complexity of the model-checking algorithm qMo-
delCheck(P,p) for a ﬁnite number of protocol sessions under the pDY intruder
is
O(gv22knn+1(nk + i + 5)(n+1)v2
k
log(nk + i + 5) + 1/ε× dnn(nk + i + 5)(2+nv)2
k
) .
Hence, the time for quantitative model checking takes essentially 1/ε more time
than classical model checking. In other words, the time increase from the DY
and the pDY model is inversely proportional to the precision ε of representing
probabilities.
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1. A → S : A
2. S → A : NS
3. A → S : H(pw,NA, NS , A), NA
4. S → A : H(pw,NA)
Fig. 3. The MS–CHAPv2 Protocol.
4 Example
To illustrate how the intruder behaves under our extension of the Dolev-Yao
model, we consider the MS-CHAPv2 authentication protocol, the Microsoft Chal-
lenge/Response Authentication Protocol, version 2 [34], presented in Fig. 4. MS-
CHAPv2 is the authentication mechanism for the Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol
(PPTP [17]), which itself is used to secure PPP connections over TCP/IP.
The objective of the MS-CHAPv2 Protocol is to achieve mutual authentication
between a client A and a server S. This authentication is carried out under the
assumption that there is an initial password pw between A and S. The protocol
goes as follows. In Step 1, the client A sends a message to the server S saying that
he wants to start a new session. In Step 2, S replies to A’s request by sending him a
fresh session-id NS . A replies to this in Step 3 by hashing the tuple (pw,NA, NS , A)
where pw is the shared password and NA is a nonce freshly generated by A, which
A also sends in cleartext appended to the hash. When receiving this message, S is
sure that he is talking to A as only A knows the value pw. Mutual authentication
is achieved if S replies back with the hash of (pw,NA) as only S knows pw and NA.
It is already known that this protocol is vulnerable to oﬀ-line guessing attacks
(see [28] and also [18]). Our extended intruder model allows us to quantify this
vulnerability. In this protocol, both agents share a password pw and authentication
depends on the agreement of the hash values exchanged in the last two steps of the
protocol.
If the intruder is able to guess the password from the hash value he receives in
Step 3, then he can impersonate the server. Below is a trace of an attack where the
intruder I assumes the role of S and agent A is led into believing he is talking to
the server and authenticates himself successfully.
1. A → I(S) : A IK1 = {H,A, S}
2. I(S) → A : NS IK2 = {H,A, S,NS}
3. A → I(S) : H(pw,NA, NS , A), NA IK3 = {H,A, S,NS , NA,
H(pw,NA, NS , A)}
4. I(S) → A : H(pw,NA) IK4 = {H,A, S,NS , NA,
H(pw,NA, NS , A),H(pw,NA)}
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In the fourth step of the trace, the intruder is able to construct and send the






H(pw,NA, NS , A)
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This constitutes an attack on the protocol. However, this is only possible if
rule guessHash is applied. In the above derivation, the application of guessHash is
tagged with a value that represents the probability that the intruder can guess pw
having knowledge IK3. The probability of obtaining H(pw,NA) is then computed
from its derivation from pDY(IK3), and the probability of success of the attack is
obtained by examining all the probabilities involved in the derivation tree of the
attack. In our case, as steps 1, 2 and 3 of the trace have no probabilities involved,
the success of this attack is given simply by p(pw, IK3), which is the only probability
in the derivation.
This is a simple example but illustrates how one can use our approach. By in-
troducing the new rules that consider probabilistic behaviors, one can explore other
types of attacks that cannot be formalized with the standard Dolev-Yao intruder
model. If one can parameterize the model-checking algorithm in such a way that
the rules reﬂect the real probability of breaking the cryptographic primitives, then
one may perform a quantitative analysis of the insecurity of a protocol.
5 Related Work and Future Work
In the last few years, much attention has been devoted to the analysis of
security protocols, for which several automated tools have been proposed,
e.g. [1,8,10,15,22,25,27,29,32]. The major drawback of these tools is that they per-
form abstractions of cryptographic primitives as functions over an algebra of terms,
in the spirit of [16]. Such abstractions may not reﬂect the cryptographic reality and
hence one may be ignoring attacks while doing this (consider as an example the
attack given in [33] on a protocol proved to be correct using automated tools [21]).
Recent work has tried to bridge the gap between these abstractions and com-
putational complexity, e.g. [2,3,4,5,6,9,11,12,14,19,20,23,24,30,31,35,36]. Among
other things, these results show that it is possible to faithfully abstract encryption
schemes and signature schemes as functions over a term algebra. More speciﬁcally,
it is shown that an intruder that interacts with the “real system” does not obtain
more information than when interacting with an “ideal system”, where decryption is
only possible when in possession of the decryption key. This is formalized as saying
that two messages that are symbolically indistinguishable, are also computationally
indistinguishable.
Let us focus on some of the most recent works that are closest to ours.
Sprenger et al. [30] proposed recently an implementation for the model given in [6]
using the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. By encoding the symbolic model of [6] in
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Isabelle/HOL, they thus provided the ﬁrst cryptographically-sound theorem prover
for security protocols. While this is a very promising approach, there is still room
for further improvements. For instance, it can only reason about protocol func-
tionalities that can be expressed in the reactive simulatability framework, leaving
aside important cryptographic tasks such as zero-knowledge, bit-commitment and
oblivious transfer.
Blanchet [9] concurrently proposed another mechanized prover for secrecy prop-
erties of security protocols. This prover, contrarily to the previous ones, does not
rely on the symbolic Dolev-Yao intruder model, but on the computational cryp-
tographic model. The proofs are done by performing a sequence of cryptographic
games and transformations, which correspond to the cryptographic reductions that
are usually done by hand.
In our work, we propose a third approach, which builds on [7] and combines
some of the characteristics of these two other approaches. We continue to use a
Dolev-Yao-style model checker but also address the possibility that some crypto-
graphic primitives can be attacked with a certain probability. We formalize such an
intruder model by extending the DY model with additional structure and intruder
capabilities, in order to be able to consider more kinds of attacks. The extended
pDY model contains intruder deduction rules that depend on the cryptographic
primitives being used. These rules are tagged with a probability of success that, if
an attack is found, will give us the probability of success of the attack (just compute
the probability of applying all the guessing rules in that branch of the derivation).
As concrete examples, we considered here rules related to encryption and hashing,
where an intruder may obtain the decryption key out of an encrypted message or
could retrieve part of the body of a hashed message. Rules for other cryptographic
operators and other kinds of guessing rules could be introduced similarly.
We also showed that by performing these extensions we do not increase the
complexity of searching for an attack when compared to the standard DY model; the
problem remains NP -complete. Hence, searching for an attack with this extended
model is as “bad” as with the classical intruder model.
The work that is closest to ours is that of Zunino and Degano [35,36], who
consider secrecy and authentication in a process calculus with cryptographic primi-
tives, where the Dolev-Yao intruder is extended with a rule to guess a secret key to
decrypt an intercepted message. They assume that guessing succeeds with a given
negligible probability and that the resources available to the intruder are polyno-
mially bounded. Although the complexity analysis they perform is diﬀerent from
ours, they reach a similar result, namely that their extended Dolev-Yao intruder
is as powerful as the standard one. Similar approaches and results are presented
in [24,31]. Zunino and Degano also consider a number of additional guessing rules,
e.g. for guessing any message, which, as we remarked above, we also plan to consider
in future work.
The extended pDY intruder model we propose requires a clear commitment to
the cryptographic primitives being used in the speciﬁed protocol, for instance, for
encryption schemes, the size of the keys and the key space. This information is
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important because it is required in the calculation of the transition probabilities
and the attack probability. As future work, we aim to enhance OFMC by extending
the underlying model-checking algorithm with a calculation of probabilities. This
will allow us to employ the tool to ﬁnd out if the attack probability is below a given
threshold ε, and reduce the search space by abandoning the state exploration when
the product of the probability labels of a certain state is less than the given ε.
In order to reduce the complexity of our algorithms, we also intend to apply to
our extended model the lazy intruder technique and other search-space-reduction
techniques implemented in OFMC. This will allow us to exploit our quantitative
approach for the analysis of industrial-scale protocols. The use of abstractions and
over-approximations for unbounded, quantitative protocol veriﬁcation will also be
an interesting avenue of future research.
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